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Research Question  
and Relevance
Public Support to the European Auto Industry: 
An Integrated Analysis
Essential Issues 
Public intervention in the automotive industry has a long, global history. In Europe, both, indi-
vidual member states and the European Union (EU), often allocate public resources to automo-
bile manufacturers through a wide variety of instruments and institutions. This willingness to of-
fer support to the automotive industry was especially evident during the financial and economic 
crisis of 2009 when this sector was particularly hard hit. Against this backdrop, a recent study 
funded jointly by ZEW’s SEEK Research Programme and the Finance Programme at the University 
of Leuven outlines and quantifies the different forms that public support to the European auto 
industry has taken over the past decade. 
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The European Commission recognises that economic analysis plays an important role in control-
ling publicly financed aid to the auto industry, and that this aid can exert a distorting effect on 
competition and trade. However, the relative stringency applied in these economic assessments 
to determine whether aid may be allocated or not varies from case to case, and it also varies with 
respect to the particular form that public support will take. In fact, state aid regulations appear 
to have been relaxed during the 2009 crisis.
Furthermore, the EU does not apply the same principles of economic analysis to so-called “scrap-
ping schemes,” nor to loans provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) — measures fre-
quently applied in response to the 2009 crisis — as it does to its state aid decisions. 
 ͮ  As for quantifying public support to the European auto industry, our lower bound estimate of 
state aid suggests that the aid declined throughout the pre-crisis period, though it peaked in 
response to the crisis in 2009. 
Moreover, state aid was supplemented by an unprecedented amount of other forms of public 
support, such as scrapping schemes and EIB loans. Taking only state aid into account could 
significantly underestimate the extent of public intervention in the European auto industry 
during the 2009 financial and economic crisis.
 ͮ  We recommend more clarity and transparency on the side of the European Commission con-
cerning ex-ante notification of public support measures, the way they are assessed, as well 
as their ex-post reporting and monitoring by the Commission. 
Key Messages
Key Messages
We find that the European Commission’s economic analysis on the control of state aid to the Eu-
ropean auto sector clearly identifies the objectives, incentives as well as the distortionary effects 
of aid on competition and trade. The stringency of economic assessment, however, varies across 
different forms of public support and individual state aid cases. 
 ͮ  Moreover, despite its recognition of the fact that aid to the auto sector may distort the mar-
ket, the Temporary Framework established in 2008 has in effect implied a relaxation on 
state aid regulation. Large amounts of aid were granted to auto makers without the usual 
notification and individual assessment requirements. 
 ͮ Furthermore, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom granted an unprece-
dented amount of public funding to auto manufacturers making use of scrapping schemes 
during the 2009 crisis. These schemes are subject to technical assessment by the Commis-
sion only while still in draft stage, and the outcomes are not disclosed. 
 ͮ  Lastly, EIB loan disbursements increased Europe-wide in response to the crisis. These loans 
were to ensure that auto-makers would continue to make long-term “green” investments. 
These loans are subject exclusively to the opinion of the Commission. A substantial assess-
ment of the projects has not yet been published.
Our lower bound estimate of state aid suggests that aid declined throughout the pre-crisis peri-
od, though it peaked at EUR 1.2 billion in response to the crisis in 2009. This state aid was then 
combined with an unprecedented amount of public funding from scrapping schemes amounting 
to at least EUR 4.0 billion; add to that EIB loans totalling EUR 2.8 billion. After the crisis peaked 
in 2009, state aid in the two years following fell to below average pre-crisis levels. 
Research Question and Relevance
Historically, a good deal of public funds at both the EU and member-state levels have been granted 
to the European automotive industry. Public authorities view this industry as very important for 
overall economic welfare. Therefore, the industry tends to receive special protection, especially 
in times of economic recession. 
 ͮ  Public intervention in the automotive industry, during the 2009 financial and economic cri-
sis nonetheless poses some difficult questions. Does it, for instance, prevent a radical and 
necessary restructuring of the industry? Or does it effectively facilitate structural adjustments 
meant to address the diversity of market failures affecting this sector of the economy? Further-
more, even if specific market failures are correctly identified, are they being addressed using 
the most appropriate instruments? 
 ͮ  In our study we first identify those instruments of public support most relevant to the Euro-
pean auto industry and review the types of economic assessment applied to each. Second, 
we quantify the amount of public support via these different instruments.
Database
We have collected a unique dataset detailing public transfers to the auto sector in Western Euro-
pean countries — namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom — for the period 2000-2011, which is based on the Commission’s 
state aid register, the EIB project database, and other European and national sources. 
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Economic Assess-
ment of Different  
Instruments
Research Results in Detail
First, our overview of the different channels through which public support is granted (see Table 1) 
suggests that the European Commission clearly recognises an important role that economic anal-
ysis plays in controlling publicly financed aid to the auto industry. On the one hand, market fail-
ures affecting the auto industry are well identified and constitute a justification of aid in tandem 
with equity considerations. On the other hand, the Commission has grown increasingly aware of 
the distorting effect that aid can have on competition and trade, especially when the aid granted 
to the auto industry is allocated for regional development or training purposes. 
Table 1: Summary of public support measures to the European auto industry
Public support instrument Level State aid Assessment Assessment type
1. GBER aid* National Yes No No
2. Regional aid National Yes Yes Standard/Detailed
3. Training aid National Yes Yes Standard/Detailed
4. R&D&I aid National Yes Yes Standard/Detailed
5. R&R aid National Yes Yes Standard/Detailed
6.  Temporary Framework National Yes Yes Standard
7. EIB loans European No Yes Opinion
8. Social public support European/National No Yes No/Standard/Detailed
9. Scrapping schemes National No Yes Technical
* GBER aid is aid granted under the General Block Exemption Regulation. Source: own presentation 
Second, the legislative framework governing state aid is open to derogation and interpretation. 
The most glaring derogation is that established by the Temporary Framework in 2008. While the 
Framework was intended de jure to ameliorate the financial and economic crisis, it de facto im-
plied a relaxation of regulations on state aid. The Framework lacked clearly defined objectives 
and rules. Notably, there was no formal control over individual state aid.
Third, in response to the crisis, member states granted an unprecedented amount of public sup-
port in the form of scrapping schemes. These schemes do not qualify as state aid since ex-ante 
the measure is assumed not to be selective — i.e. the measure is granted without discrimina-
tion, for instance with regard to the origin of the product in question. The Commission assesses 
the schemes’ compatibility with technical regulations and their potential distortionary effect on 
trade. However, there is no formal compatibility assessment of the schemes with respect to state 
aid, and no official decision has yet been published. 
Fourth, at the European level, loans granted by the EIB constitute a considerable source of support 
to the auto industry, and these loans are subject to the opinion of the Commission. No substan-
tial assessment of those projects has yet been published, and the Commission is not entitled to 
request additional information from the granting authority as it would otherwise be in the case of 
regular state aid grants. The question as to whether the Commission managed to coordinate the 
instruments for public support of the auto industry within the European Union itself still remains 
unanswered. We do however recognise the role of the Commission in limiting subsidy races be-
tween individual member countries.
Our lower bound estimate of state aid (see Table 2) suggests that state aid to the auto industry 
declined over the last decade, though it peaked in response to the crisis in 2009. Following this 
peak, aid in 2010 and 2011 declined to an average that was even lower than pre-crisis level. How-
ever, total state aid granted to the European auto industry at the peak of the crisis in 2009 was 
still less than public support granted through scrapping schemes, EIB loans, and social funds. 
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Table 2: Quantification of public support to the European auto industry (EUR million)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
State aid instrument
GBER aid 3.8 3.8
Regional aid 46.0 303.0 590.1 78.5 26.5 106.4 7.4 89.3 15.8 51.4 1314.4
Training aid 19.7 2.7 54.6 4.6 14.2 5.6 23.2 14.7 17.1 156.2
R&R aid 6.5 6.5
Temporary 
Framework 1125.0 96.8 1221.8
Total state aid 46.0 322.6 592.8 133.1 31.1 127.1 13.0 23.2 14.7 1214.3 112.6 68.5 2698.9
Public support instrument (that does not entail state aid)
EIB loans 525.0 845.0 400.0 580.0 550.0 245.0 697.0 750.0 650.0 2800.0 2822.0 1195.0 12059.0
– “aid element” 78.8 126.8 60.0 87.0 82.5 36.8 104.6 112.5 97.5 420.0 423.3 179.3 1808.9
EGF support 4.8 15.1 4.3 52.5 76.7
Scrapping schemes 19.2 4057.2 1334.9 12.0 5423.3
 Source: own estimations 
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In conclusion, it is essential to take a broader view of public support rather than limiting assess-
ments to state aid alone, in order to obtain a more comprehensive as well as revealing picture of 
the nature and effect of public interventions and to evaluate the extent to which protectionism 
might characterize economic recessions. 
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